From a Crisis of Image to a Strategy of Unity

An analytical essay on the current situation of Iranians and the need to return to negative, human-rights-based, coalition-building demands

Prepared from the analytical framework and proposed remarks of Mr Peyman Bakhshayesh

May 2026

English version

Executive Summary

The Iranian freedom movement stands at a decisive point. It possesses enormous moral and human capital, built through sacrifice, repression, imprisonment, executions and the courage of ordinary citizens. At the same time, it faces a crisis of image, language and strategic prioritisation. The first task is not a premature struggle over the final form of power; it is to end the structure of repression, defend the dignity of citizens, release political prisoners, stop executions and return politics to law, civil rights and the free choice of the people.

This essay argues that the most effective axis for passing beyond the Islamic Republic is a set of negative and legal demands: no to the Islamic Republic, no to repression, no to executions, no to political imprisonment, no to secrecy about victims and detainees; and, positively, yes to the release of political prisoners, yes to independent truth-finding, yes to human rights, yes to democratic secularism, yes to free elections and yes to the right of self-determination. Such an axis can bring together constitutional monarchists, republicans, liberals, nationalists, democratic leftists, secular religious citizens, ethnic and religious minorities, women, workers, students and civil-society forces within a minimum but powerful front.

Within this framework, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi can be understood as a political axis for transition, national cohesion and the representation of Iran's historical continuity. Yet excessive insistence on imposing the final form of government before victory can narrow the social base of the movement and push potential allies away. The issue is not to deny constitutional monarchy; it is to embed it in the democratic centre of society through constitutionalism, parliamentarianism, secularism and the free vote of the nation.

The strategic conclusion is clear: the movement must move away from the language of exclusion, humiliation and internal demonisation; rebuild its human, national, modern and freedom-oriented image; treat the repressive state as the principal adversary rather than citizens who think differently; and focus on demands that generate maximum moral legitimacy, maximum coalition capacity and maximum international pressure.

1. The Problem: A Crisis of Image and a Crisis of Priority

In recent years, part of the Iranian opposition has kept alive the demand for passing beyond the Islamic Republic through courage, sacrifice and persistence. At the same time, the regime's propaganda apparatus and some political competitors have tried to project a distorted image of the nationalist, monarchist and constitutionalist current: not as a national and freedom-oriented force, but as a small, extremist, anti-human, anti-minority movement supposedly aligned with the far right in the West and indifferent to human rights. If this image is left unanswered, it can gradually reduce the movement's moral legitimacy and limit its ability to build coalitions.

The problem is not only an external propaganda war. Part of the damage comes from inside the movement itself: harsh language against ordinary citizens, declarations against forces that should be within the same broad front, exclusionary behaviour on social media, reducing politics to tests of loyalty, and shifting attention from the repressive state to internal conflicts. In such an atmosphere, the main adversary is forgotten and the movement's energy is spent on exhausting boundary-making instead of organisation, defence of victims, release of prisoners and international pressure.

The second crisis is one of priority. A movement that is still in the phase of ending an entrenched system risks splitting the freedom front if it devotes all its force to positive slogans about the final form of government. The final constitutional structure must be determined through a free, lawful and secure process after the machinery of repression has been dismantled. Before that point, the practical axis should be demands that are morally undeniable and politically coalition-building: freedom, dignity, truth, justice and the right of self-determination.

2. The Moral Capital of the Movement: Blood, Sacrifice and the Responsibility of Representation

The repression of protests, mass arrests and the use of executions as an instrument of intimidation have created immense moral and political capital for the Iranian freedom movement. Reports by human-rights organisations and international bodies concerning the 2025-2026 period describe arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment, unfair trials, death sentences and executions, as well as restrictions on expression and assembly. These records show that Iran's crisis is not merely a factional dispute; it concerns the right to life, the right to protest, the right to fair trial and the right of the people to participate freely in determining their future.[1][2][3][4]

This moral capital becomes political force only when the movement can present itself not as a faction seeking revenge, but as the representative of Iranian human dignity. Victims of repression, political prisoners, families seeking justice, protesting women, students, workers, minorities and all citizens deprived of a normal life must stand at the centre of the narrative. If the movement instead becomes absorbed by identity conflicts or the humiliation of potential allies, it sells its moral capital cheaply.

The task today is therefore not simply to condemn the Islamic Republic. The task is to build an image of the future in which ordinary people can see themselves. Iranians must feel that the post-Islamic Republic future will not be a future of blind revenge, collective exclusion, social cleansing or the imposition of a new ideology; it must be a future of law, security, freedom, elections, equal opportunity, normal relations with the world and respect for the dignity of citizens.

3. Why Negative Demands Build Broader Coalitions

In transitions from authoritarian rule, negative demands often have greater mobilising capacity because they focus on rejecting an obviously unacceptable condition. When one says 'no to executions', 'no to repression', 'no to political imprisonment' and 'no to the Islamic Republic', these statements do not require complete agreement about economics, culture, constitutional design or the final form of the state. They are minimum lines of human dignity and political freedom.

By contrast, positive slogans about the final form of power, if raised prematurely and exclusively, immediately create identity and factional questions: republic or monarchy; left or right; centralist or federal; liberal secular or social democratic; what relation between religion and state; what kind of foreign policy. These questions are important, but their final answers must be determined in a free environment after the repressive structure has been dismantled, through elections, a constituent assembly or a referendum.

A wise strategy does not deny future differences. It respects the sequence of politics. First comes agreement on ending despotism, releasing prisoners, stopping executions, guaranteeing freedom of expression, forming transitional institutions, securing international monitoring and creating the conditions for a free vote. Then the nation can decide on the final form of government. This is the difference between a coalition for transition and competition for the future government.

4. Constitutional Monarchy as a Historical and Institutional Adhesive

Iran is a historical nation whose political memory did not begin with the modern state of the last century. For many Iranians, monarchy, the Khosravani tradition, state continuity, the flag, the territory and the name of Iran are connected to historical continuity and symbolic stability. In a society where the Islamic Republic has tried to redefine the nation through official religion, ideology, fear and repression, a return to national symbols can function as a social adhesive between past, present and future.

The monarchy defended in this essay, however, is not absolute, personalistic or ideological monarchy. It is constitutional monarchy: a system in which sovereignty comes from the nation, the government emerges from parliament, parties compete under law, fundamental rights are protected, and the monarch or national symbol acts as a guarantor of continuity and institutional neutrality, not as a political party or ideological commander.

From this perspective, constitutional monarchy must be placed in the centre of society, not on the fringe of the far right. The major danger is that opponents - and sometimes poorly advised supporters - reduce it to an identity-based, vengeful, anti-minority or authoritarian project. Such a reduction contradicts the spirit of constitutionalism and gives republicans, leftists and liberal democrats an opportunity to present monarchy as a threat to freedom. A credible defence of constitutional monarchy must rest on constitutional law, parliamentarianism, free elections, secularism, separation of powers and human rights.

5. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi: Leader of the Transition, Not an Instrument for Pre-imposing the Result

In a transitional situation, societies need recognisable symbols, trust-building figures and coordinating axes. For a significant part of Iranians, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has come to play such a role: a symbol of Iran's continuity, the possibility of national reconciliation and political leadership for passing beyond the Islamic Republic. The importance of this role lies in its capacity to bring dispersed forces together around an immediate goal: ending the current system and bringing the country to the stage of a free vote.

Strategically, however, one must distinguish between leadership for transition and the prior determination of the final form of government. Using the Crown Prince's popularity to create a national coalition against the Islamic Republic is a political necessity; turning that popularity into an exclusive demand for immediate determination of the future form of government can separate part of society from the transitional front. Some citizens may support his leadership during the transition while wishing to decide the final form of government at the ballot box. Driving those citizens out is a strategic mistake.

Mature constitutionalism should say: we believe in constitutional monarchy, but the final right of decision belongs to the nation. We recognise the Crown Prince as an axis of transition and national unity, but the future must be stabilised through law, vote and a free process. This language builds public trust and neutralises propaganda attacks.

6. The Danger of Leaving Parliamentarianism: Using Democracy to Destroy Democracy

One of the central concerns in any political transition is that illiberal forces may use democratic mechanisms to destroy democracy. Twentieth-century experience shows that elections alone are insufficient. Without a constitution, fundamental rights, judicial independence, media freedom, limits on executive power and party loyalty to the rules of the game, democracy can be hollowed out from within.[7][8]

In Iran, this danger is real. Different ideological currents - from revolutionary Islamists to authoritarian leftists and the far right - may treat democracy not as a lasting rule of the game but as a bridge to exclusive power. Constitutionalism and parliamentarianism are necessary precisely to contain this danger. All forces should have the right to participate, but only if they accept constitutional rules, secularism, human rights, rejection of political violence and rotation of power.

The defence of the future system must therefore focus less on emotional slogans and more on institutional design: a clear constitution, prohibition of violence and paramilitarism in politics, a constitutional court or mechanism of constitutional review, free and competitive elections, accountable political parties, free media and guaranteed minority rights. This is where constitutional monarchy can be linked to liberal democracy and help prevent politics from becoming permanent revolution.

7. Rebuilding the External Image: A Normal, Human and Globally Engaged Iran

The Iranian opposition must be aware of destructive external image-making. The regime and its critics may try to equate Iranian nationalism with racism, anti-migrant politics, global far-right movements, Islamophobia or the whitewashing of foreign violence. The effective answer is neither passivity nor emotional reaction. The answer is to offer a clear and humane image of Iranian civic nationalism.

Iranian civic nationalism means defending Iran as the common home of all citizens, regardless of religion, ethnicity, language, gender, lifestyle or lawful political orientation. This nationalism can maintain normal and respectful relations with the world: with Gulf states, neighbours, Europe, the United States, Israel and any country that builds relations with a future Iran on the basis of national interest, security, trade, peace and mutual respect. Such foreign policy is neither surrender nor adventurism; it is the normalisation of Iran's place in the world.

The movement must distance itself from language that describes human beings as rubbish, filth, inherently treasonous or natural enemies. Such language is not only morally wrong; it is politically dangerous because it prepares the psychological ground for future violence. If post-Islamic Republic Iran is to be free, it must start practising the language of freedom now.

8. The Error of Excessive Focus on Positive Slogans

At certain moments, parts of the opposition, feeling victory to be near, moved towards maximalist and positive slogans: the definite alternative, the definite form of government, the definite future structure, and at times the exclusion of forces that did not accept this certainty. In the short term, this approach may create a feeling of power and cohesion. In the medium term, however, it can generate a philosophical, cultural and moral crisis, because it does not resolve society's real questions; it merely suppresses them.

A significant part of Iranian society may already have passed beyond the Islamic Republic while remaining undecided about the final form of government. This group must not be expelled from the movement by premature insistence on a final answer. Coalition politics means being able to say: today we unite over ending despotism, freeing prisoners, stopping executions, truth-finding, secularism, free elections and the right of self-determination; tomorrow we compete under law and at the ballot box over the form of government.

This change of language is not a retreat from conviction. It is political maturity. A constitutional monarchist can remain a constitutional monarchist; a republican can remain a republican; a democratic leftist can keep a social programme; a liberal can defend free markets. But all must accept that the transition stage is the stage of shared minimums.

9. Proposed Framework for a Renewed Strategy

Based on the analysis above, the practical strategy of the movement can be summarised in six axes:

First: return to negative and legal demands - no to the Islamic Republic, no to executions, no to repression, no to political imprisonment, no to secrecy about victims and detainees.

Second: transform the moral capital of the victims into political pressure through documentation, legal accountability, independent truth-finding, support for families and prevention of forgetting.

Third: present a humane image of Iranian nationalism - Iran for all Iranians, not Iran for one faction, one class, one ethnicity or one ideology.

Fourth: establish Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as an axis of transition and national unity, while emphasising the free vote of the nation on the final constitutional structure.

Fifth: contain intra-front extremism by avoiding language of exclusion, humiliation, demonisation and declarations against ordinary citizens and potential allies.

Sixth: focus on the institutional design of the future - constitution, parliamentarianism, secularism, human rights, separation of powers, judicial independence, lawful parties and free elections.

10. Drawing the Line Against Violence, Revenge and Collective Exclusion

A successful transition does not mean leaving criminals unaccountable. Those who have ordered killing, torture, executions, bloody repression or major corruption must answer before justice. But justice is different from collective revenge. The freedom movement must distinguish between direct perpetrators and millions of citizens who have lived inside the existing structure because of fear, coercion, livelihood, limited information or the complexities of social life.

If Iran's future is built on collective exclusion, the Islamic Republic has not been defeated morally; another version of the politics of hatred has merely replaced it. But if the future is built on justice, fair trial, truth-finding, compensation and national reconstruction, then the movement proves that it differs from the repressive system not only in political power but also in the philosophy of government.

For this reason, today's political language is vital. The words used now on social media shape tomorrow's political imagination. If we strip people of their humanity today, defending their rights tomorrow becomes difficult. If we insist today on law and dignity, the possibility of democratic order tomorrow increases.

11. Constitutional Monarchy and Democratic Republicans

One of the most important tests of political maturity for constitutional monarchists is how they deal with democratic republicans. Not every republican is an enemy of Iran or of monarchists, just as not every monarchist is authoritarian. The main division should be between democratic and anti-democratic forces, not simply between republic and monarchy.

If a republican is committed to secularism, free elections, human rights, territorial integrity, rejection of violence and the right of self-determination, that person or current can be a partner in the transitional front. Competition with them should be postponed to the day of freedom and the ballot box. Conversely, any force - republican, monarchist, left, right - that seeks to use democracy to abolish democracy must face lawful and political constraints.

This perspective turns constitutionalism from a closed identity into a national project. A national project means building a container in which all lawful forces can compete, while no force can destroy law, freedom and fundamental rights.

12. Conclusion: Returning to the Correct Path

The correct path is one in which country, flag, transitional leadership, history, nation and future are placed within a coherent narrative. But this narrative must not become the premature imposition of a result or the exclusion of potential coalition partners. Victory becomes closer when the majority of society and a significant part of world public opinion accept that the Iranian freedom current is not extremist or vengeful, but human, national, modern, law-oriented and trustworthy for the future.

Constitutional monarchy can be presented as a historical and institutional adhesive for Iranian society; but to succeed it must sit at the democratic centre of society, not on the margins of extremism. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi can be an axis of transition and national unity; but the durable legitimacy of the future must come from the free vote of the nation, a constitution and democratic institutions.

The essay ultimately rests on one principle: the main adversary is the Islamic Republic and the structure of repression, not Iranians who think differently. The path to victory lies in human rights, the release of political prisoners, ending executions, truth-finding, secularism, free elections and the right of self-determination. Through this path it is possible both to defeat the Islamic Republic and to build a future in which ordinary Iranians can live normally, freely, with dignity and at peace with the world.

References

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2. Amnesty International. Human rights in Iran: country information and current updates, 2026.

3. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Iran: UN experts demand transparency and accountability following nationwide protests. 20 February 2026.

4. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran: report to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/61/59, March 2026.

5. Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2026: Iran Country Report. 2026.

6. V-Dem Institute. Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling the Democratic Era? University of Gothenburg, 2026.

7. Loewenstein, Karl. Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights. American Political Science Review, 1937.

8. Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. Crown, 2018.

9. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

10. Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Routledge, 1945.