Pahlavism and Political Pragmatism

From the Islamic Republic's Deadlock to the Possibility of a Secular Democratic Alternative in Light of the Reported Agreement Between the Islamic Republic and the United States

Author: Peyman Bakhshayesh

MD, PhD, MBA

Date of writing: June 2026

Author's note: This article is based on a series of political discussions and analyses by the author and his friends. It is not an official report of negotiations. It is an analytical and scholarly article about the relationship between political pragmatism, future oriented Pahlavism, the Iranian opposition, and the reported agreement or understanding between the Islamic Republic and the United States. Where news data are not fully settled, the article uses conditional and analytical language.

Table of Contents

1. Abstract

2. Introduction: the main question of the article

3. Theoretical framework: political pragmatism and democratic transition

4. First point: the pragmatism of the people and the primacy of human dignity

5. Second point: Pahlavism as a competitive political brand

6. Third point: future oriented Pahlavism versus backward looking Pahlavism

7. Fourth point: pragmatism inside the Islamic Republic

8. Fifth point: the pragmatism of the opposition and the need for the conductor of the revolutionary orchestra

9. Sixth point: there is no inside and outside Iran, only Iranians with us or with them

10. Seventh point: the future political framework of Iran

11. Eighth point: how does the Pahlavi card remain on the table?

12. Conclusion

13. References

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between Pahlavism and political pragmatism at the current moment in Iranian politics. This is a moment in which the reported agreement or understanding between the Islamic Republic and the United States, together with the ideological deadlock of the Islamic Republic and the inability of a fragmented opposition to produce unified leadership, has moved Iranian politics into a new phase. The central argument of the article is that the people of Iran are not primarily fighting for the authenticity of a historical name. They are fighting for human dignity, freedom, welfare, security, the abolition of executions, equality between women and men, the rule of law, a free economy, and the possibility of normal political and social life. The attention given by parts of society to Prince Reza Pahlavi can be understood from this perspective. In Iran's political memory, Pahlavism is understood as a code for welfare, a normal state, constructive relations with the world, secularism, modernism and legal stability.

The article distinguishes between two forms of Pahlavism: future oriented and pragmatic Pahlavism, which thinks in terms of secular democracy, technocracy, development and national reconciliation; and backward looking and romantic Pahlavism, which reduces politics to an unconditional defence of every action of Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah. Against this dichotomy, the article argues that political pragmatism for the opposition means standing beside the people, understanding the costs of struggle, avoiding the imposition of historical nostalgia onto the livelihood and freedom oriented demands of society, and organising all democratic forces within a secular, legal and parliamentary framework. The article concludes that as long as the agreement can create tangible changes in people's lives, it does not essentially conflict with future oriented Pahlavism. Yet whenever the Islamic Republic becomes stuck because of its ideological nature, record of repression and institutional weakness, the Pahlavi card will once again return to the table of Iranian society.

Keywords: Pahlavism, political pragmatism, secular democracy, Reza Pahlavi, Iranian opposition, Islamic Republic, democratic transition, human dignity

Introduction: the Main Question of the Article

At the current moment, when a reported agreement or understanding between the Islamic Republic and the United States is under way, Iranian society faces a fundamental question. If the people want freedom, welfare, the abolition of executions, equality between women and men, a free economy, expanded commercial relations with the world and normal life alongside the countries of the region, what is the relationship between these demands and Pahlavism? Does every economic and legal opening inside the Islamic Republic mean the defeat of Pahlavism? Or, conversely, is future oriented Pahlavism the political name of that same horizon of welfare, freedom, law and a normal state, and therefore value compatible with any real opening in people's lives?

The answer of this article is clear. Future oriented Pahlavism is not mere nostalgia. It is a competitive political brand that remains on the table until Iran reaches secular democracy. This brand becomes more active whenever the Islamic Republic becomes stuck in implementing its commitments, in political opening, in ending state violence, in establishing the rule of law or in creating a free economy. But if part of the ruling structure, under pressure and in deadlock, can create a tangible and positive opening in people's lives, a pragmatic opposition should not be disturbed by the welfare of the people. Politics exists for the people, not the people for politics.

The deadlock of the Islamic Republic in the final years of the leadership of Seyyed Ali Khamenei, especially in foreign policy and in the question of war and negotiation, drew public attention toward the opposition outside the country and toward Prince Reza Pahlavi personally. The Prince was able to offer a framework for the unity of democratic forces by emphasising principles such as territorial integrity, secular democracy, equality of citizens before the law and the people's right to choose freely. Yet this framework has not yet become the full leadership of a revolutionary orchestra. It has not reached the point at which, by his command, the majority of society would enter a general strike, coordinated civil disobedience or nationwide noncooperation. This gap between symbolic hope and organisational capacity was one of the reasons why an agreement entered the political agenda.

Theoretical Framework: Political Pragmatism and Democratic Transition

Political pragmatism in this article does not mean abandoning principles. Pragmatism means preserving fundamental principles while understanding costs, timing, the capacity of society, the capacity of repression, the balance of forces and the real possibilities of political action. In the literature on democratic transition, political change is usually the result of several factors at the same time: splits inside the ruling elite, social pressure, international opportunity, a crisis of legitimacy, economic crisis and the organisational capacity of the opposition (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Therefore no great transformation can be explained by slogans alone, by war alone, by negotiation alone or by the street alone.

Political opportunity theory in social movements also emphasises that people enter costly action when they see a tolerable balance between hope of victory and fear of repression (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015). If the cost of action exceeds people's perception of its benefit, society may turn to waiting, caution or lower cost forms of action even at the height of dissatisfaction. From this angle, the absence of a large uprising after war or after the weakening of the hard layers of the Islamic Republic should not be confused with social indifference. It may represent a pragmatic calculation in the face of the danger of massacre, poverty, instability and repression.

At the institutional level, political pragmatism cannot lead to sustainable development without the rule of law and predictable institutions. Institutionalist theory shows that capital, trade and welfare grow only where the rules of the game are predictable, property is protected, the judiciary acts independently and the state moves away from ideological and sudden decisions (North, 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Fukuyama, 2011). From this perspective, future oriented Pahlavism becomes meaningful when it can present itself as a package of secularism, the rule of law, technocracy, investment security, legal equality and normal relations with the world.

First Point: the Pragmatism of the People and the Primacy of Human Dignity

The first point of analysis is that the people of Iran, like the people of any other country, primarily follow the principle of human dignity, welfare, freedom, security, peace of mind and the expansion of life opportunities. People do not merely want to shout a historical name in the street. They want to live, work, travel, invest, maintain relations with the world, not fear execution and repression, see women and men equal before the law, and ensure that the future of their children is not held hostage by the ideological foolishness of the ruling structure.

In this sense, the people's attention to Prince Reza Pahlavi should not be equated with a primary and absolute attachment to every part of Pahlavi history. People looked toward Pahlavi because, in the historical and political memory of Iran, Pahlavi is linked to a normal state, modernisation, good relations with the West and Israel, administrative order, development, security and a degree of welfare. In other words, for a significant part of society, Pahlavi is a sign of the possibility of a better life, not necessarily an object of historical worship.

This distinction is extremely important. If pro Pahlavi forces imagine that people entered the field in order to take revenge on the revolutionaries of 1979, to whitewash every action of the Pahlavi era or to rebuild the symbols of the past, they will commit a strategic mistake. What moves society is the primacy of welfare and freedom. Therefore a pragmatic opposition must welcome every real opening in the lives of the people, even if that opening temporarily emerges from parts of the existing structure. The final criterion is not the group interest of the opposition, but the interest of the people of Iran.

Human rights reports about the Islamic Republic's increased use of the death penalty, especially in recent years, show that the demand for abolition of executions and legal security is one of the main pillars of human dignity in Iran (Amnesty International, 2026). In such a situation, any political force that wants to be a credible alternative must place life, the right to defence, fair trial and the rejection of revenge at the centre of its programme. This is precisely where future oriented Pahlavism must separate itself from revenge seeking romanticism.

Second Point: Pahlavism as a Competitive Political Brand

The second point is that Prince Reza Pahlavi, through his personal character and political package, remains a competitive political brand until Iran reaches secular democracy. Political brand here does not mean superficial publicity. It means a combination of name, historical memory, personality, trust, networks of supporters, political message, the possibility of foreign relations and an image of the future that can be reactivated at moments of deadlock.

Over the past four decades, Reza Pahlavi has reached this position for several reasons. First, symbolically, he is connected to the legacy of Pahlavi state building. Second, politically, he has repeatedly said that the final form of government must be determined by the vote of the people. Third, in recent years he has emphasised minimum principles for the unity of democratic forces: Iran's territorial integrity, separation of religion from government, legal equality and individual freedoms, and the people's right to choose their political future freely. These four principles have also been prominent in his interviews and speeches (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025; Iran International, 2026).

Yet a political brand cannot be built by symbol alone. If Reza Pahlavi wants to move from symbolic hope to practical leadership, he must be able to organise Iran's diverse opposition, create a shared language, place scattered forces within a democratic framework and provide minimum arbitration between different political currents. Metaphorically, he must still move from the position of symbol of hope to the conductor of the revolutionary orchestra: a leader under whom each group plays its own instrument, but all participate in one common political composition.

Third Point: Future Oriented Pahlavism Versus Backward Looking Pahlavism

The third point of the article is the distinction between future oriented Pahlavism and backward looking Pahlavism. Future oriented Pahlavism seeks to build tomorrow's Iran: a secular, democratic Iran with a free economy, rule of law, modern institutions, normal relations with the world and legal equality for all citizens. This form of Pahlavism takes inspiration from the Pahlavi experience of state building, but it does not imprison itself in the defence of every historical decision made by Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah.

By contrast, backward looking Pahlavism is more concerned with historical cleansing, the complete whitewashing of the past and the reconstruction of romantic emotions around monarchy. At times, instead of defending the primacy of the human being, welfare and freedom, this tendency defends the primacy of Pahlavi itself in Iranian history. Such an approach may generate emotional enthusiasm among some supporters, but it is not enough for a society seeking welfare, security and freedom.

The strategic error of backward looking Pahlavism is that it assumes people entered the street to defend the past. Yet many people, if they show an inclination toward Pahlavi, do so for a better future. In Pahlavism they see not merely a family name, but the possibility of a normal state, normal relations with the United States, Israel, Europe and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, an open economy, capital security and a free way of life. Therefore, if Pahlavism wants to remain alive and competitive, it must remain future oriented.

Table 1: Comparison of future oriented Pahlavism and backward looking Pahlavism

Fourth Point: Pragmatism Inside the Islamic Republic

The fourth point returns to the Islamic Republic. From the beginning, the Islamic Republic has contained a structural tension between ideology and survival. On the one hand, its political DNA is rooted in political Islam, hostility toward the West, hostility toward Israel, the doctrine of velayat e faqih, the securitisation of society and the export of ideology. On the other hand, whenever the cost of continuing ideology has become too high, parts of the system have turned toward pragmatism.

The acceptance of Resolution 598 and the end of the Iran Iraq war was the first example of this pragmatism. The JCPOA under Hassan Rouhani was the second. Now, the reported agreement or understanding with the United States, if it stabilises and is implemented, may become the third example. Reuters reports in June 2026 indicate that the parties discussed a framework for ending the war, reopening energy routes, nuclear restrictions, easing part of the economic pressure and even investment mechanisms, although the details and final commitments still require verification and phased implementation (Reuters, 2026a; Reuters, 2026b; Reuters, 2026c).

This point is important: pragmatism by the Islamic Republic does not mean that the essential problem of the Islamic Republic has been solved. The system may retreat in moments of crisis, but its ideological roots, structures of repression, institutional corruption, lack of judicial independence and networks of security based interests may remain intact. Therefore an agreement can create an opening, but it does not guarantee transition to the rule of law. It is precisely in this gap that the Pahlavi card remains on the table.

If the softer parts of the ruling structure can implement commitments, open the economic space, halt executions, respect women's rights and move Iran toward a normal state, society will benefit. But if the Islamic Republic becomes stuck again because of its ideological structure, future oriented Pahlavism can appear as a ready and competitive alternative.

Fifth Point: the Pragmatism of the Opposition and the Need for the Conductor of the Revolutionary Orchestra

The fifth point concerns the opposition. A pragmatic opposition must first stand beside the people, not against their cost sensitive choices. If people did not enter a broad uprising after war and after seeing the destructive capacity of the Islamic Republic, this does not necessarily mean the defeat of their spirit. Society may have calculated pragmatically that the security configuration of the Islamic Republic could lead to mass killing, a war economy, greater poverty and the Talibanisation or Gazaisation of the country's political space.

In such a situation, the opposition must not humiliate the people for caution. The duty of the opposition is to reduce the cost of political action, build organisation, make strikes possible, create aid networks, manage relations with the body of the state, and prepare institutionally for the next moments. Revolution is not merely an explosion in the street. A successful revolution is a combination of leadership, organisation, strikes, the erosion of loyalty among the forces of repression, an economic programme, external legitimacy and reassurance to society.

From this perspective, Prince Reza Pahlavi has so far been able to unite parts of the opposition around general principles, but he has not yet turned the entire opposition into one coherent political bloc. If he can become the conductor of Iran's diverse political society, he will achieve a major political victory. This means that the Mojahedin e Khalq, if it wants a place in Iran's political future, must move away from a sectarian and armed form and operate as a democratic Islamic party within a secular democracy. Left wing forces such as the Worker Communist current, Hekmatist groups, the Fadaiyan, Rah e Kargar and other groups must be able to appear within social democracy, trade unionism, social justice and parliamentary competition. Nationalist, traditionalist or east oriented forces may also operate as legal nationalist parties, as long as they are committed to territorial integrity, equal rights for citizens and free elections.

Therefore, the pragmatism of the opposition means transforming historical enmities into legal competition in the future. This is what many successful transitions have done: removing political violence from competition and turning ideological force into parliamentary parties. The literature on democratic transition shows that without a minimum pact among hostile forces, the danger of returning to authoritarianism or entering chaos remains very high (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Huntington, 1991).

Sixth Point: There Is No Inside and Outside Iran, Only Iranians With Us or With Them

The sixth point concerns the artificial divide between inside and outside. One method of weakening the opposition is to separate Iranians from one another with geographic labels: internal opposition versus external opposition. But in today's world this division no longer has its former meaning. The internet, social networks, messaging applications and satellite media have placed Iranians in Tehran, Tabriz, Sanandaj, Zahedan, Ahvaz, Shiraz, London, Berlin, Toronto and Los Angeles within a single political space.

Many Iranians outside the country did not migrate for leisure. They left because of revolution, repression, war, sanctions, discrimination, lack of opportunity or political insecurity, but their families, memories, language, roots and political concerns remain in Iran. Therefore they are not outside Iran. They are the transnational part of the Iranian nation.

At the theoretical level, a nation is not an imagined community in a negative sense, but a network of memory, language, history, emotion and shared political imagination (Anderson, 1983). Being Iranian is not limited to place of residence. Just as ethnicity, language and region must not separate Iranians from one another, inside and outside must not become a tool for discrediting the political voice of Iranians. In this sense, the more accurate slogan is: there is no such thing as Iranian inside and Iranian outside; there are Iranians with us or with them.

Seventh Point: the Future Political Framework of Iran

The seventh point concerns the future political framework of Iran. From a pragmatic perspective, the future framework must be open enough for all political forces to compete within it, but principled enough not to lead again to dictatorship, separatism, religious government or ideological violence. Therefore the four foundational principles of Prince Reza Pahlavi, namely territorial integrity, secular democracy, equality of citizens before the law and the right to free elections, can function as the minimum common ground of democratic forces.

This framework may be a parliamentary republic or a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. But the content is more important than the name of the framework: separation of religion from government, an elected parliament, an independent judiciary, free media, legal parties, guarantees for women's rights, minority rights, administrative decentralisation without harming territorial integrity, and armed forces subordinate to the elected government. If the future Iran is to be stable, no party, family, ideology or ethnicity should regard itself as the exclusive owner of Iran.

Ethnic and regional parties can also freely work for the cultural, linguistic, economic and administrative rights of their groups, provided that they remain within the framework of one Iran, secular democracy, citizenship equality and free elections. This approach prevents the repression of local identities, while also preventing identity politics from turning into a project of national collapse. Such a balance in plural societies is one of the foundations of democratic stability (Brubaker, 1996; Gellner, 1983).

Eighth Point: How Does the Pahlavi Card Remain on the Table?

The eighth point is the central thesis of the article: the Pahlavi card remains on the table because the Islamic Republic structurally faces several obstacles. The first obstacle is the ideology of political Islam, which is still present in the constitution, security institutions, religious networks and the political economy of the system. The second is the record of repression and deep public mistrust. The third is the absence of the rule of law and judicial independence. The fourth is the contradiction between a free economy and rent seeking security networks. The fifth is ideological foreign policy and deep regional and global mistrust.

If the agreement temporarily bypasses part of these obstacles, society will breathe. But if the Islamic Republic again becomes stuck in implementing its commitments, if executions continue, if women's rights are not respected, if investment fails because of legal insecurity, if relations with the world once again become hostage to ideological slogans, the Pahlavi card will return with greater force. This card becomes active not merely because of the Pahlavi name, but because of the Prince's political character, his forty seven years of persistence, his planning in recent years and his ability to produce hope for a better life.

Pahlavism, if it remains future oriented, can be the largest existing political package for reducing investment risk, rebuilding the state, returning Iran to the global economy, establishing normal relations with the United States, Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and building the rule of law. Anti imperialist leftists, former Islamist forces and many ideological currents have a historical hesitation when it comes to Israel and the regional order. But future oriented Pahlavism, if it takes the rights of all peoples of the Middle East as its foundation, can defend both Israel's right to existence and security and the rights of Palestinians, Arabs, Kurds, Baluch and other nations and groups of the region. This is a pragmatic and rights based foreign policy.

Ultimately, Pahlavism wins when it separates itself from ideological backward looking politics and speaks the language of the future. The Prince must gather pragmatists, technocrats, lawyers, economists, managers, civil activists, labour forces, women, young people, ethnic communities, secularised religious forces and democratic republicans around common minimums. The more he can move from symbolic leader to practical coordinator of diverse forces, the more he will exercise hegemony over the opposition.

Conclusion

This article has shown that the relationship between Pahlavism and political pragmatism must be understood from the perspective of the people. The people of Iran want, before anything else, freedom, welfare, security, abolition of executions, equality between women and men, a free economy, normal relations with the world and predictable life. If the Islamic Republic, in light of the current agreement or understanding, can answer part of these demands, a pragmatic opposition should not consider it its own defeat. Democratic politics means the primacy of the people, not the primacy of a political group.

At the same time, however, the Islamic Republic, because of its ideological nature, record of repression, institutional weakness and internal contradiction between political Islam and a normal state, will probably become stuck many times on the path of reform and pragmatism. In each of these moments, the Pahlavi card will return to society's table, not as a romantic return to the past, but as the possibility of building a secular, democratic, technocratic, legal and development oriented future.

Future oriented Pahlavism can become the unrivalled alternative only when it distances itself from whitewashing the past, historical revenge seeking and symbolic romanticism, and turns itself into a programme for the rule of law, a free economy, human rights, national reconciliation, normal foreign policy and the unity of the opposition. The people of Iran do not want Pahlavi for Pahlavi's sake. They want Pahlavi only insofar as that name is linked to welfare, freedom, dignity, order and a better life. The future belongs to pragmatists.

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